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INTRODUCTIONIN 2011, THERE WERE 1,466 general aviation accidents (civil-
ian aviation incidents excluding scheduled commercial airline
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flights) in the United States.' However, according to the U.S.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), there are very
few new causes of these aviation accidents.2 Most of the causes of
general aviation crashes each year are repeated causes of previ-
ous incidents.3
Since 2000, the crash rate for commercial jetliners has
dropped by 85%.' Commercial airline crashes due to icing, mid-
air collisions, inadvertent ground contact, and turbulence-his-
torically, the primary causes of many commercial airline inci-
dents-have virtually disappeared with improved technology
and training.' In contrast, according to the NTSB, the crash rate
of private flights over the same time period has increased by
20%.6 In addition, the rate of deadly wrecks involving private
flights has increased by 25% since 2000.' For some reason, pri-
vate pilots are not benefiting from increased safety knowledge
and technology in the same way as commercial pilots.' What is
the cause of the deviation in the number of safety-related inci-
dents in private flights compared to commercial airline flights?
This comment examines several issues that might contribute to
these disturbing statistical trends. First, it compares pilot licens-
ing, training, and medical requirements for flying private and
commercial passenger flights. Then, this comment discusses
continuing education requirements and the disturbing trend of
general aviation pilots being unable to learn from past mistakes.
Next, it examines current safety regulations and technology de-
viations between the two different industries. Finally, this com-
ment discusses recommendations to decrease the general
aviation crash rates.
I Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Final Agenda for NTSB's General
Aviation Safety Forum Announced (June 13, 2012) [hereinafter NTSB Press Re-
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I. GENERAL PILOT LICENSING
Overall, there are two main entities involved in the regulation
of airline safety within the U.S. government. Regulation of the
aerospace industry as an independent entity was first initiated by
Congress in 1926 with the Air Commerce Act.' This Act estab-
lished the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to provide for
the "safe and efficient use of the airspace""o and was eventually
placed under the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)."
The FAA is still the main entity responsible for issuing all of the
regulations for U.S. aerospace systems, including regulations for
the aircraft itself, as well as for pilots, aircraft inspections, air-
ports, and commercial airline manufacturers and service
providers. 12
The safety aspect of the aerospace industry is overseen by the
NTSB, an independent agency of the federal government." The
NTSB is in charge of investigating all civil aviation accidents,
and it issues many of the aviation accident statistics available to
the public.1 4 The NTSB also has the power to review FAA certifi-
cations and licenses through formal hearings involving the FAA
and the petitioning party.'5 Both the NTSB and the FAA play a
major role in determining the aviation safety requirements nec-
essary to adequately protect aircraft pilots, passengers, and peo-
ple on the ground.
Generally, all pilots are required to be certified under Part 61
of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).'" Part 61 prescribes
the requirements for issuing pilot certificates and ratings, sets
out which certifications are necessary for certain types of aircraft
and flight, and sets the limitations that the certifications pro-
9 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
10 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (re-
pealed and recodified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
11 Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931
(repealed and recodified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
12 See 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 23, 43, 61, 91, & 139 (2012). See generally FAA, http://
www.faa.gov (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
1s History of the National Transportation Safety Board, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD.,
http://www.ntsb.gov/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
14 Id.
15 See 49 U.S.C. § 44703(d) (2006); Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners, FAA,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office org/headquartersoffices/avs/offices/aam/
ame/guide/app-process/general/appeals/ntsb/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
16 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 61.
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vide.17 Once a pilot has passed all of the FAA-issued require-
ments for a license, a pilot receives a "private pilot certificate."',
Each certificate contains limitations on the "privilege level" at
which a pilot is allowed to fly and lists which aircraft "categories"
and "classes" are authorized under that privilege level.1 The
privilege levels discussed in this comment include those for pri-
vate pilots, who may fly for pleasure or personal business with-
out compensation; commercial pilots, who are allowed to fly for
basic compensation, with some limitations; and airline transport
pilots, who are authorized to fly as pilots-in-command of sched-
uled passenger aircraft. 2 0
A pilot can also separately add an "instrument rating" to cer-
tain licenses by taking additional, intensive instrument and me-
teorology training and instruction beyond that required for the
basic pilot certificate license. 21 This certification gives private pi-
lots the ability to fly using "instrument flight rules," which are
used when private pilots must rely mostly upon the aircraft's in-
struments-rather than upon outside visual references-due to
non-ideal weather conditions, such as cloudy or stormy
weather.2 2
To add a license or certificate, a pilot is usually required to
complete three steps: (1) undergo training from an FAA-certi-
fied flight instructor; (2) log specific flight experience related to
the license to be earned; and (3) pass a knowledge exam consist-
ing of written, oral, and practical components carried out by an
FAA inspector or a pilot examiner.23
The FAA has the power to impose limitations on all of these
licenses if a pilot lacks certain necessary skills to exercise the
rights of that particular privilege level or aircraft category or
class.24 Limitations can also be imposed due to medical condi-
17 Id. § 61.1(a).
18 See id. § 61.5(a) (1).
19 See id. § 61.5(a)-(b).
20 Id. § 61.113 (private pilots); id. § 61.133 (commercial pilots); id.
§ 121.437(a) (airline transport pilots).
21 See id. § 61.65. But see id. § 61.153(d) (demonstrating that to be eligible for
an airline transport license, an instrument rating must already be achieved dur-
ing an earlier licensing level).
22 Id. §§ 61.57(c), 91.155, 91.205(d); FAA, FAA-H-8083-15B, INSTRUMENT FLY-
ING HANDBOOK (2012), available at http://wmy.faa.gov/regulationspolicies/
handbooksmanuals/aviation/media/faa-h-8083-15b.pdf.
23 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.102-.117, 61.151-167 (discussing the requirements that
must be met for each level of pilot certification).
24 Id. § 61.13(b)-(c).
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tions." While pilot licenses never expire, pilots are required to
maintain regular flight experience and must undergo flight re-
views with an FAA instructor every two years.26 Medical examina-
tions are required at specified intervals depending on a pilot's
age, medical history, and the level of flight certification held.
A. PRIVATE VS. COMMERCIAL AIRLINE PILOT
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
The requirements of licensure for a private pilot versus a com-
mercial airline pilot vary significantly. A majority of active pilots
hold private pilot certifications. 28 A private pilot certificate is the
first step for any pilot wanting to eventually obtain an airline
transport pilot license.2 9 Under FAR Part 61, a pilot hoping to
obtain a basic private pilot license must: (1) be at least seven-
teen years old; (2) be able to speak, write, and understand En-
glish; (3) obtain at least a third-class medical certificate; (4) pass
the required knowledge exam; and (5) log at least forty hours of
flight time, including ten hours of solo flight time and at least
three hours of night training.so This certification gives a pilot
the ability to fly as long as the meteorological conditions allow a
pilot to see and avoid obstacles while flying.." If weather condi-
tions are such that a pilot is unable to use visual cues, such as
horizon location or other nearby aircraft identification, a private
pilot must have an additional instrumentation certificate to be
allowed to fly.32
In contrast, a pilot-in-command of a commercial airline oper-
ation must earn the highest level of licensure for piloting abil-
ity-the airline transport pilot license. 3 To obtain an airline
transport license, a pilot must have at minimum 1,500 hours of
25 See id. § 61.23.
26 See id. § 61.56.
27 See id. § 61.23(d) (showing a table of specified medical certificate
expirations).
28 Scott Spangler, 2010 Updates Pilot Population Highs & Lows, JETWHINE (Mar.
9, 2011), http://wwwjetwhine.com/2011/03/2010-updates-pilot-population-
highs-lows/.
29 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.123(h) (requiring that applicants for a commercial certifi-
cation first be certified as a private pilot); id. § 61.153(d) (requiring that appli-
cants for an airline transport pilot certification first be certified as a commercial
pilot).
30 Id. §§ 61.103-.109, 61.23(a)(2)-(3).
31 See id. § 91.155.
32 Id. § 61.57(c).
3 Id. § 135.243(a) (1).
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flight time, including 100 hours of nighttime flying and 75
hours of instrumentation flight time.3 4 Other requirements in-
clude being at least twenty-three years old, passing a knowledge
examination, and obtaining a first-class medical certificate. Al-
though a second-in-command pilot of a scheduled commercial
airplane previously had to obtain only a commercial license, in
February 2012, the FAA issued a proposal that would require a
second-in-command pilot to also obtain an airline transport pi-
lot license." For second-in-command officers, this meant a
change from a minimum of 250 hours of flight time to 1,500
hours before they could obtain the necessary licensing.37
B. PILOT MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS
A private pilot has a lower medical clearance requirement
than a pilot of a commercial airliner." The FAA has the sole
authority to issue medical certificates and can issue a certificate
or reject certification to a pilot at any time based on medical
reasons." Private pilots are required to pass a third-class medical
examination.40 This examination is similar to a yearly checkup
and requires information about general health history and
mental health issues, as well as basic vision and hearing tests." A
third-class medical examination is valid for five years for people
under forty years of age.42 Otherwise, the examinations are re-
quired every two years.
By contrast, a first-class medical examination is required for
pilots who are in charge of scheduled commercial airliners (i.e.,
airline transport pilots).4" These exams are much more exten-
3 Id. §§ 61.153-.159.
3 Id. §§ 61.153-.159, 61.23(a) (1).
36 Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Opera-
tions, 77 Fed. Reg. 40 (Feb. 29, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 121,
135, 141, & 142).
7 Press Release, FAA, FAA Proposes to Raise Airline Pilot Qualification Stan-
dards (Feb. 27, 2012) (on file with author).
3 14 C.F.R. § 61.23; Summary of Medical Standards, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/
about/officeorg/headquarters-offices/avs/offices/aam/ame/guide/media/sy-
nopsis.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
so See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44702, 44703(a), 44709; 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(c), 67.4; Become a
Pilot-Medical Certificate Requirements, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/pilots/become/
medical/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
40 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.23(a) (3).
41 Id. §§ 67.301-.313.
4 Id. § 61.23(d).
4 Id.
44 Id. § 61.23(a) (1).
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sive, requiring the basic exam as well as cardiovascular function
testing, age-related testing, and an EKG.4 5 First-class medical ex-
aminations are valid for one year for pilots under forty years of
age.4 6 Otherwise, the examinations are required every six
months.
In addition to the difference in medical examination require-
ments, the age specifications vary significantly between private
and air transport licenses. As stated above, the minimum age at
which one can receive a private pilot license is seventeen, and
there is no upper age limitation as long as the medical examina-
tion requirement is met." For pilots in the commercial passen-
ger airline industry, the minimum required age to obtain an air
transport license is twenty-three; however, commercial airline pi-
lots are required to retire from commercial passenger piloting
at age sixty-five." They can continue on as private or commer-
cial pilots, but they cannot fly scheduled commercial passenger
aircraft.-o
C. LICENSING DIFFERENCES AS A CAUSE OF
PRIVATE AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS
Pilot error is the most common cause of plane crashes. 51 Pilot
judgment is needed to deal with issues relating to weather con-
ditions, navigation, instrumentation reading, aircraft operation,
and many other tasks. 2 As shown above, there are many signifi-
cant differences between pilots of private planes and pilots of
scheduled commercial passenger aircraft." The number of
training hours needed before licensure, the minimum required
medical standards, and the age restrictions could play a part in a
pilot's judgment abilities before, during, and after a private
flight.
Studying current FAA regulations to determine the leading
causes of private aircraft crashes is difficult given the multitude
45 Id. §§ 67.101-.113.
48 Id. § 61.23(d).
4 Id.
48 Id. § 61.103(a).
49 Id. §§ 61.153(a), 121.383(e) (1).
50 Id. § 121.383(e) (1).
51 Pilot Error: The Most Common Cause of Airplane Crashes, LEWIS & TOMPKINS,
P.C., http://www.lewisandtompkins.com/library/pilot-error-the-most-common-
cause-of-airplane-crashes.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013); Statistics, PLANECRASH
INFo.com, http://planecrashinfo.com/cause.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
52 See Pilot Error, supra note 51.
53 See supra Part L.A-B.
2013] 387
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
of piloting requirements, the differences in those requirements
between private pilots and scheduled commercial passenger air-
line pilots, and the many factors that can play a role in a deadly
aircraft accident. Most of the licensure requirements for private
pilots are significantly less restrictive than licensure require-
ments for commercial airline pilots, but this could be a reflec-
tion of the difference in difficulty between commercial
passenger transport and private airplane flying. However, the
fact that the number of general aviation crashes continues to
rise while the number of commercial airline incidents decreases
suggests that some discrepancy does exist.54
1. Flight Hour Requirements
Between August 1, 2003, and April 30, 2004, the NTSB col-
lected study data on general aviation incidents that occurred
due to weather-related factors. While the study was meant to
review weather-related risk factors in general, 6 it also gave a
glimpse into the role that pilot training and experience might
play in aviation safety, along with what factors might increase
the successful decision-making skills of some pilots over others.
Pilots involved in weather-related general aviation crashes were
compared to pilots with similar flight training experience and
history who had not had accidents during the same time pe-
riod.57 The data from the study involved only general aviation
accidents-it excluded scheduled commercial passenger
flights.58 Pilots involved in the study ranged in age from
nineteen to eighty-one, with the mean age between forty-six and
fifty-three.59 The average number of years of flight experience
was approximately eighteen.o While the pilots in the study were
operating general aviation flights, they could have held any li-
censee status available, ranging from the lower-level private pi-
lot's license to the highest-level airline transport certification.6"
54 See Levin, supra note 4.
55 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY NTSB/SS-05/01, RISK FACTORs As-
SOCIATED WITH WEATHER-RELATED GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTs 21 (2005) [here-
inafter NTSB SAFETY STUDY], available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/safetystud
ies/SSO501.pdf.
56 Id. at 14.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 21-22, 24.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 22-24. -
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One of the first graphs provided by the NTSB safety study dis-
played the type of pilots typically involved in weather-related
general aviation crashes. 6 2 The graph split the pilots into "acci-
dent" and "non-accident" groups." The overall licensing distri-
bution of the study pilots not involved in weather-related crashes
was approximately 35% private licensees and 27% airline trans-
port licensees.6 4 However, of the pilots in the study who were
involved in accidents, 61% of the pilots involved in weather-re-
lated general aviation crashes held only a private pilot's li-
cense. Only 4% of the pilots involved in weather-related
general aviation crashes held the highest-level airline transport
license.6 6
This data skew was similar when the study looked at the pilots
generally over an eighteen-year period. 7 Figure 7 shows that
general aviation crashes were overwhelmingly (approximately
50%) more likely to occur for private pilots than all other pilots
combined." Overall, as shown in Figure 7, the studies found a
significant statistical difference in the types of licenses held by
accident and non-accident pilots flying the same planes, with a
much higher percentage of private licensees in the accident
group.' This data emphasizes that obtaining a higher-level li-
cense plays an important role in a pilot's knowledge and deci-
sion-making skills in aviation safety and crash avoidance.
What was most interesting was that a pilot's number of years
of flight experience had little to no effect on whether the pilot
would be involved in a general aviation accident.7 0 It would be a
natural inference that as a pilot gains more aviation experience,
the pilot's judgment and knowledge should improve, decreasing
the chance of an accident. However, in the study, there was no
corresponding difference in the number of years of piloting ex-
perience held by the accident and non-accident groups.7 Recal-
ling from above, private pilot license holders are only required
to log forty hours of flight time before receiving their private
62 Id. at 23.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 23, 25.
65 Id. at 22-23.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 23.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 25.
71 Id.
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pilot's certificate.72 Airline transport license holders, in compari-
son, are required to log 1,500 hours. This is a large disparity in
the number of flight hours required. However, the lack of a rela-
tionship between years of flight experience and accident poten-
tial demonstrates that this discrepancy may not be to blame for
the high accident rate among private pilot licensees compared
to airline transport licensees, at least with regard to small, pri-
vate general aviation aircraft.
The data above definitively shows that private pilots are less
prepared than their higher-licensed counterparts when it comes
to preventing weather-related general aviation crashes. The fact
that gaining years of flight experience after receiving certifica-
tion does not decrease accident likelihood suggests that the ini-
tial training requirements are even more important.7 4 The lack
of a definite relationship between overall flight hours and acci-
dent potential emphasizes that classroom hours and knowledge
exams at the initial stages of licensure must play a large role in
accident prevention.
In summary, while the amount of knowledge and training
needed for airline transport licensees to fly large scheduled
commercial airliners is greater than that required to fly a simple,
four-seat private aircraft, the data above shows that the in-
creased training pays off when it comes to safety-even if the
additional information is not essential to the actual ability to fly
a small private plane. This large difference in pilot safety in
weather-related, accident-prone conditions mandates that the
training for private pilots be increased to better reflect the train-
ing received by their advanced-licensed, safer counterparts.
However, the counterintuitive data regarding flight experience
and the lack of correlation with safety risks suggest that increas-
ing the required number of flight training hours for private pi-
lots, while possibly beneficial, is not a complete solution.
2. Testing Requirements
Both airline transport pilots and private pilots are required to
pass knowledge and practical exams before a certificate can be
granted.7' All knowledge exams last two to three hours and re-
72 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(a) (2012).
73 Id. § 61.159(a).
74 See NTSB SAFETY STUDY, suipra note 55, at 25.
75 See id.
76 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.103(e), 61.103(h), 61.153(f)-(g).
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quire a score of at least 70% to pass.77 If a student receives a
failing score on a knowledge exam, the student is required to
present an endorsement from an authorized flight instructor
that the required additional flight training has been completed
before the test can be retaken." Practical exams involve a flight
monitored by an approved instructor to determine an appli-
cant's knowledge of aircraft flying procedure and good decision-
making skills. While the FAA provides a list of guidelines to be
used by the designated pilot examiners, the examiner has sub-
jective control over whether a student passes or fails. 0
In the NTSB study discussed above, there was a statistical dif-
ference between accident and non-accident pilot scores on both
the knowledge and practical exams." Because the pilots in the
study had taken different numbers of tests (depending on
whether any of the tests were retaken and depending on the
licensure level received), the NTSB determined a "cumulative
pass rate" score for each pilot by dividing the total number of
tests passed by the total number of tests a pilot had taken. For
knowledge exams, the accident pilots had a mean pass rate of
86%, while the non-accident pilots had a cumulative pass rate of
95%." For practical tests, the accident pilots had a mean pass
rate of 84%, while the non-accident pilots had a cumulative pass
rate of 95%.8' These statistics suggest that pilots' success with
the testing-based education received for pilot certification corre-
lates with future safety risks.
As the data above demonstrates, airline transport pilots are
involved in fewer crashes in private aircraft than private aviation
licensees. The data also indicates that an increase in flight hours
generally does not correct the safety discrepancy between the
different levels of licensees. Because passing scores on knowl-
edge- and practical-based testing are the only other learning-
based requirements to earn a license besides achieving the re-
quired number of flight hours, the data trends show that these
77 FAA Airman Knowledge Testing, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/training-testing/
testing/airmen/media/testingmatrix.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
78 14 C.F.R. § 61.49(a).
79 Id. §§ 61.103(h), 61.107(b).
so Id.; see Dave Wilkerson, Checkride: Watching the Watchers, AOPA (Mar. 2004),
http://flighttraining.aopa.org/magazine/2004/March/200403_Departments
Checkride.html.
81 NTSB SAFETY STUDY, supra note 55, at 27-28, 40-41.
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initial examinations are very important in helping prevent avia-
tion crashes in the future.
Overall, the NTSB study shows that, on average, pilots who are
prone to weather-related accidents achieved lower scores on
both knowledge and practical exams than airline transport pi-
lots. This could be due to two reasons. First, in general, pilots
involved in general aviation accidents could be less intelligent or
less knowledgeable when it comes to aviation overall, leading to
lower scores on tests related to these topics. If this is the issue,
the correction is simple. When pilots fail a general aviation
knowledge exam, instead of simply requiring an additional sign-
off by an instructor to retake the same exam, the FAA should
require additional classroom and examination time to increase
knowledge skills. Assuming that the failure to pass is due to a
lack of understanding, the response should be mandated educa-
tional requirements and additional examinations. Since the
safety risk is higher for these particular individuals, the in-
creased education will work to protect the pilots themselves as
well as passengers and other pilots.
Second, if pilots who are prone to weather-related accidents
are more likely to be private licensees and are more likely to
have failing grades on knowledge or practical examinations,
then perhaps private pilot training is responsible for the correla-
tion. To correct this problem, the FAA should increase the class-
room time and number of tests required to receive a private
pilot's certification. To become an airline transport pilot, practi-
cal- and knowledge-based tests must be taken at each certifica-
tion level before reaching airline transport testing levels. Since
airline transport pilots have to take so many tests to obtain ad-
vanced licensee status, these pilots might become better at these
examinations over time, and the additional testing could eventu-
ally lead to higher passing rates as the number of tests previously
taken increases. Either way, the passing rate for both types of
examinations is a direct indicator of safety risk and should not
be ignored by the FAA.
One additional fact that the NTSB study pointed out was that
not having an "instrument rating" increased the risk that a pri-
vate licensee would be involved in a weather-related general avi-
ation accident by almost five times." An instrument rating
requires additional, intensive airplane instrument and meteoro-
S 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.153(d), (f)-(g).
86 NTSB SAFEY STUDY, supra note 55, at 34.
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logical training." Having this rating also increases the type of
weather conditions in which a licensed pilot is approved to fly."
This statistic reemphasizes the importance of additional class-
room education requirements before obtaining a pilot's license.
Additional classroom time and examinations, specifically in the
areas of weather and flying an airplane in lower visibility condi-
tions (instrument training), increase the likelihood of prevent-
ing a weather-related general aviation crash. While this seems
logical-additional weather training leads to fewer weather-re-
lated crashes-it is important to remember that the pilots in-
volved in the study were not breaking any weather-related flying
regulations. Pilots who have not received instrumentation train-
ing are generally only allowed to fly in clear, visible weather con-
ditions." A little less than half of the study pilots were operating
in conditions that did not require the additional instrument
testing and rating.o They were, however, involved in weather-
related crashes. This suggests that although risky weather condi-
tions can occur even in good visibility, the achievement of an
instrument rating decreases the risk of an accident no matter
what the conditions outside appear to be. Considering that an
accident is five times more likely without the instrument rating,
this testing requirement should be added to the private pilot's
license as a requirement, not an option. No pilot should be al-
lowed to fly without knowing how to operate the plane in lower
visibility weather conditions. Instrument training should be im-
perative, even with the most advanced meteorological technol-
ogy, because weather can be erratic and unpredictable. In
addition, being allowed to fly a plane is a privilege, not a right,
and pilots should not fly without advanced knowledge of how to
operate the aircraft, no matter what the situation.
3. Pilot Medical Requirements
Scheduled commercial passenger airline pilots are required
by law to retire at age sixty-five." However, the retirement is a
condition only for scheduled commercial airline pilots flying for
income; a pilot over the age of sixty-five can continue to fly gen-
87 14 C.F.R. § 61.65.
88 See id. § 61.57(c).
89 See id. §§ 61.57(c), 91.155, 91.205(d); see also FAA, INSTRUMENT FLYING HAND-
BOOK, supra note 22.
90 NTSB SAFETY STUDY, supra note 55, at 21.
91 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(e)(1).
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eral aviation for other reasons.9 2 When they reach the age of
sixty-five, pilots have no more need for the airline transport li-
cense, and pilots might drop down to private licensee status
(due to medical requirements or other reasons) so that they can
continue to fly for pleasure. Because of this, it is logical to think
that age is possibly a factor in the statistics described above. If, as
the earlier NTSB study suggested, there is a significantly higher
percentage of private license holders involved in general avia-
tion accidents, then perhaps this statistic is not related to ad-
vanced licensing (and thus the extensiveness of training
received), but the age of the pilot." If most of the pilots in-
volved in the weather-related accidents are over sixty-five, this
would explain the high percentage of private pilot licensees in-
volved in crashes-pilots over sixty-five no longer have airline
transport licenses!
Reviewing the data, this could partly be the case. A distribu-
tion of the study pilots by age at the time of accident showed
that the over-sixty age group was overrepresented in the acci-
dent group, accounting for almost 40% of the studied accident
pilots, and underrepresented in the non-accident group, ac-
counting for only 15% to 20% of the non-accident pilots stud-
ied.94 Mathematical analysis of pilot age in the NTSB study
showed a meaningful statistical difference in average age be-
tween the studied accident and non-accident pilots, with the av-
erage accident pilot being far older than his or her non-accident
counterpart. 5
Over the last sixty years, the FAA has agreed that age is di-
rectly correlated to a pilot's safety risk and flying ability. The
FAA's stance in numerous cases where pilots asked for exemp-
tion from the rule has been that the evidence clearly shows that
the advanced age of a pilot increases the risk of an accident due
to sudden incapacitation or skill deterioration, and that there is
no evidence to the contrary strong enough to qualify any pilots
for an exemption from the baseline rule."
92 See id. Part 121, which applies only to scheduled air carrier operations and
not to private operations, is the only provision containing a mandatory retire-
ment age. See id.
93 See NTSB SAFETY STUDY, supra note 55, at 23.
94 See id. at 24.
95 Id.
96 See Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318, 319 (7th Cir. 1990); see alsoYetman v. Garvey,
261 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2001); ProfI Pilots Fed'n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 767
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Some pilots have argued that instead of a mandatory retire-
ment age, the medical examination requirements should
change more radically as pilots age to ensure the health of older
pilots. 9 7 This would allow pilots to remain at work longer, as
long as they are physically healthy and do not pose a safety
risk.9" However, the FAA has been firmly opposed to this idea.99
The FAA explained that older pilots are much less reliable in
terms of sudden health changes.'o While certain conditions in
younger pilots can be adequately monitored and assessed, FAA
doctors are "unable to determine whether an older but appar-
ently healthy pilot will be afflicted with a dangerous condi-
tion."10 ' In addition, doctors are "unable to predict with which
of the myriad conditions that accompany advancing age an indi-
vidual pilot is likely to be afflicted."1 0 2 While the statute recently
changed the mandatory retirement age from sixty to sixty-five to
reflect the findings of the latest advanced age-related cognitive
studies, the FAA has not changed its original opinion that the
benefits of additional experience do not outweigh the risks of
flying at an advanced age."0 '
Considering the emphasis the FAA has put on requiring pilots
over the age of sixty-five to retire from scheduled commercial
airline flight, it is interesting that the rule has not been applied
evenly to all pilots, including pilots flying general aviation solely
for pleasure. Small aircraft are much more likely to be involved
in accidents than large commercial airliners.' Typically, there
is only one pilot in a small general aviation aircraft. In commer-
cial flights, there are multiple trained pilots, allowing for backup
if something occurs that renders a pilot unable to fly the plane
as planned. If FAA doctors are unable to predict when an ad-
vanced age pilot will become incapacitated, why are we allowing
pilots over the age of sixty-five to pilot small, private aircraft
alone, especially when there are innocent passengers onboard?
9 See Yetman, 261 F.3d at 667-68, 671-72; Prof1 Pilots Fed'n, 118 F.3d at 762,
767; Baker, 917 F.2d at 321-28.
98 Yetman, 261 F.3d at 668.
9 Id.
100 Prof'1 Pilots Fed'n, 118 F.3d at 767.
101 Id. at 765.
102 Id.
103 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(e) (1)-(2) (2012) (additional restrictions are placed
on pilots at age sixty and above regarding flight operations between the United
States and foreign countries).
104 Levin, supra note 4.
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Planes are different than other forms of transportation in that
each crash has a higher likelihood of fatalities due to the height
the plane is above the ground (versus a car or boat, for exam-
ple). While older pilots might argue that the required retire-
ment age for commercial aircraft should not be applied to
private planes (as private flying for pleasure does not put one
hundred or so passengers at risk), an older pilot flying alone is
still putting innocent bystanders on the ground at risk. The FAA
has repeatedly emphasized that data confirms that older pilots
have a much greater risk of being involved in an aviation
crash.' 5 If this is true, and if the FAA is unwilling to expand the
mandatory sixty-five retirement age to flying private aircraft for
personal reasons, the FAA should institute a mandate that older
pilots can only fly over relatively unpopulated areas so that the
safety risk they decide to take for themselves does not affect
other people on the ground. While an individual has a right to
make a decision involving an acceptable risk to his or herself,
that individual has no right to heighten the risk to others and
possibly hurt innocent bystanders by making unsafe decisions.
An important statistic that appeared in the study conducted
by the NTSB was the correlation between safety risk and the av-
erage age at which a pilot obtained his or her first pilot certifi-
cate. 1 6 A significant statistical difference was found between the
average ages at which the accident and non-accident pilots
earned their first pilot certificate, with the non-accident pilots
being much more likely to have received their first license
before reaching age twenty-six.o' Overall, pilots who achieved
their initial license after age twenty-five were three to five times
more likely to be involved in a weather-related general aviation
accident."o' The NTSB explained this discrepancy by noting that
pilots who begin flying at different ages have different motiva-
tions for learning to fly.' 09 Pilots that start flying early in their
lives are more likely to consider aviation as a future career in-
stead of simply as a hobby for pleasure."o Because of this, the
initial choices about training types and the amount of education
might be more involved than an individual simply trying to get a
10 SeeYetman v. Garvey, 261 F.3d 664, 667-68, 671 (7th Cir. 2001); Prof' Pilots
Fed'n, 118 F.3d at 762, 767; Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1990).
106 NTSB SAFETY STUDY, Supra note 55, at 25, 34.
107 Id.
os Id. at 34.
1o Id. at 37-38.
Ho Id.
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pilot's license later in life for only personal or recreational rea-
sons."' For example, individuals who want to pursue a long-
term career in aviation "with the intent of becoming paid profes-
sional pilots engage in full-time flight training that typically re-
sults in a regular schedule for practicing and testing knowledge
and skills, regular oversight, and an immersion in the aviation
environment."' 1 2 In addition, pilots that plan on having a career
in the industry might put more emphasis on passing certifica-
tion classes and tests because employers review this information
as part of the pilots' educational history before they can begin
their careers. 1 3 In contrast, pilots who choose aviation as a
hobby or for personal reasons usually do not have the time to
devote to full-time schooling and practical development.1 1 4 The
education might be stretched over a longer, more infrequent
period, and pilots are likely to strive toward simply passing the
certification classes because their overall scores have no effect
on their future career opportunities."'
This information supports the previously stated conclusion
that better education and training lead to an overall lower
chance of weather-related general aviation crashes. However,
these statistics might also just be a reflection of the fact that pi-
lots with advanced airline transport licenses are less likely to be
involved in a general aviation crash than private licensees."' 6 Pi-
lots at the age of thirty-five and older are far less likely to be
considering a change in career, and thus have no need for the
advanced airline transport licensee status. The fact that younger
certified pilots are involved in these types of crashes less often
might just mean that most of the pilots that were certified at a
younger age received the airline transport certificate, and thus
the advanced training requirements, not age, are the reason for
the skewed distribution.
Regardless, this statistic reemphasizes the importance of the
classroom portion of the education required to receive a pilot
certification. It is important to increase the education and
knowledge required, both through classroom lessons and exam-
inations, so that general aviation pilots fly just as safely as pilots
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II. CONTINUING EDUCATION AND THE INABILITY TO
LEARN FROM PAST MISTAKES AS A CAUSE OF
GENERAL AVIATION INCIDENTS
One statistic that must be corrected is the inability of general
aviation pilots to learn from past mistakes. The NTSB chairman
stated that the reason why the general aviation accident rate is
stubbornly stuck at the current rate-while technology improve-
ments and corporate safety records continue to help lower the
accident rates in larger commercial aircraft-is that general avi-
ation "'pilots are not learning from the deadly mistakes made by
their brethren.' 1 1 7 According to the NTSB, there are very few
new causes of private aviation accidents." 8 Most of the causes of
general aviation crashes each year are simply repeated causes of
previous incidents.'1 9 In the NTSB weather-related safety study,
statistics showed that pilots with a history of previous accidents
or incidents were 3.1 times more likely to be involved in a
weather-related general aviation accident. 2 0 This statistic is
astonishing because these pilots, who have risked death and
came out unscathed, are not more cautious the second time
around! In addition, pilots are not learning from the mistakes of
other pilots. When the NTSB issues study results, like the
weather-related accident information referred to above, pilots
continue to be involved in crashes for the same reasons the
study was put together in the first place.12' For example, the
NTSB chairman referred specifically to the weather safety study
and then pointed to a May 20, 2011, small general aviation
plane crash where a plane hit a mountainside, causing the death
of the pilot.12 2 The reason for the accident was that the pilot did
not check weather reports before flying the specified route. 2 1
Regardless of whether the pilot in the May 20th crash read the
specific weather-related safety study issued by the NTSB in 2005,
the need to check the weather reports before flying an airplane
is a basic rule that a pilot learns in the initial education period
before achieving a private pilot's certification.124 While checking
117 Levin, supra note 4.
118 NTSB Press Release, supra note 1 (providing safety information through an
embedded video).
119 Id.
120 NTSB SAFEw' STUDY, supra note 55, at 34.
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the weather report before flying is something that this pilot
should have known about regardless of NTSB weather studies,
relying on these released data reports with statistics and graphs
to educate or remind pilots to take precautions when flying is
not enough.
Pilots' licenses do not expire.'2 However, general aviation pi-
lots are required to complete a flight review within twenty-four
months of piloting any aircraft.12' A flight review consists of a
review of the general operating and FAA flight rules, along with
a review of maneuvers and procedures followed to safely exer-
cise the privileges of the pilot certificate. 1 27 At a minimum, the
flight review must consist of one hour of flight training and one
hour of ground training.12 8
The flight review requirement is regarded by some pilots and
flight instructors as a "bare bones band aid to break some of the
bad habits." 129 Because of this, the FAA also set up an FAA Safety
Team (FAASTeam) to promote flight safety through continuing
education above and beyond the minimal flight review require-
ment.3 o The FAASTeam representatives see it as a challenge to
convince pilots to engage in a learning program that focuses on
all types of aviation safety in an online format that can be ac-
cessed from any location in the United States.1 "' The group has
seminars, online courses, and "hot topics" to promote safety in
general aviation.'1 2 It addresses the safety topics and recommen-
dations issued by the NTSB and FAA in an easy-to-understand,
educational format.' 3 The FAASTeam has removed the statis-
tics, graphs, and legalese, and instead has provided free videos,
magazine articles, and fun, educational seminars for pilots of all
types.' 3 4 There is a pilot proficiency program that tracks pilots as
they complete the online educational resources and attend the
local presentations, and the program presents pilots with safety
125 Id. § 61.19(c).
126 Id. § 61.56(c).
127 Id. § 61.56(a).
128 Id.
129 Lynnwood Minar, Safer Skies Through Continuing Education, MIDWESTF-
LYER.COM, http://www.midwestflyer.com/?p=4649 (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
130 FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADvisoRY CIRCULAR 61-91J, WINGS-PILOT
PROFICIENCY PROGRAM 1 (2011) [hereinafter ADVISORY CIRCULAR 61-91J].
131 Id.; see FAA Safety Team, FAA, http://www.faasafety.gov (last visited Sept. 12,
2013).
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"wings" for achieving certain safety milestones.1 3 5 The profi-
ciency program also requires additional flight time, 36 preferably
with an instructor that the pilot has never flown with before.
The FAASTeam hosts yearly awards banquets and recognizes pi-
lots who have achieved exceptional safety status."'3 It enables pi-
lots and employers to be involved in the program by nominating
or presenting employees with certain awards based on training
received, and it awards employers themselves when a certain
number of employees meet FAASTeam safety standards.' 8 Re-
ceiving continued education through the FAA-sponsored pro-
gram can also count as a more in-depth, thorough flight review
that meets the requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 61.56."
The FAASTeam automated, online resource was established
in 2006.140 It fills a need that NTSB safety studies do not-it
takes the language of statisticians, engineers, and safety experts
and turns it into information that is easy to understand and in-
teresting. It also offers motivation outside the basic need to sim-
ply complete the required flight review. The awards program
involving both pilots and their employers makes it fun for the
pilots, but adds the additional incentive of employer awareness,
lending to its creditability outside simply meeting FAA-required
standards for license upkeep. The education is fresh and cur-
rent, more so than a two-hour flight review with an instructor
who has been certifying for twenty years. It also works to correct
the statistic of pilots not learning from past mistakes, as the edu-
cational requirements specifically address this issue.
The FAASTeam continuing education program should be
taken a step further. The remedy of teaching pilots how to learn
from past mistakes has already been implemented by this tool,
and it should now become a requirement for all pilots. Engi-
neers, lawyers, hairdressers, and numerous other professions are
required to take continuing education every year to improve
knowledge and proficiency, and to keep safety at the forefront
of their profession."' The general aviation industry, led by the
13 ADVISORY CIRCULAR 61-91J, supra note 130, at 2.
136 Id. at 1.
137 See FAA Safety Team, supra note 131.
138 See generally id.
139 See ADVISORY CIRCULAR 61-91J, supra note 130, at 2.
140 Kevin L. Clover, Introducing the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team,
FAA (Apr. 10, 2013, 7:42 PM), http://www.faasafety.gov/hottopics.aspx?id=43.
141 See, e.g., CE Requirements-Engineering, NAT'L Soc'Y OF PROF. ENGINEERS (Oct.
10, 2012), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/education/state_ce_require
ments.pdf; MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
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FAA, should do the same by mandating that pilots take these
courses and attend these seminars every year to keep their pi-
lots' licenses current. The FAA should include these require-
ments with the other general aviation requirements in Title 14
of the Code of Federal Regulations, and should prohibit pilots
from leaving the ground unless their continued education is up-
to-date.
III. LESS STRINGENT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AS A
CAUSE OF GENERAL AVIATION INCIDENTS
Public aviation on commercial airliners is the most visible and
accessible type of air travel for a majority of Americans. Because
of the increased percentage of citizens participating in commer-
cial flight, along with the high visibility of the industry, commer-
cial airline travel is the beneficiary of a high number of
requirements and government standards for regulation. When
safety standards lapse during a commercial flight, the response
from the public is often loud and immediate, calling for respon-
sive action from both the industry and the government to en-
sure that the issue never occurs again. With the high scrutiny
surrounding this area, the regulations are always current and
enforced by public opinion, large commercial airline manufac-
turers, and the FAA. General aviation, however, is lacking this
intense media visibility and public outcry. Because of this lack of
visibility, standards in the general aviation industry could fall be-
low those of the commercial airline industry, resulting in the
discrepancies in accident rates and safety risk discussed above.14 2
Some of these regulation deficiencies between commercial and
general aviation aircraft include the areas of operator manage-
ment, aircraft maintenance and inspection, and technology
improvement.
A. OPERATOR REGULATIONS By OPERATION
Along with regulating pilots by licensee status, the FAA also
regulates pilot operations by type. The FAA has three main tiers
of aviation oversight regulations: (1) private owner operations-
smaller aircraft that are not for hire; (2) small commercial oper-
ations-smaller aircraft configured for thirty passengers or less
cle/mandatory cle/mcle-states.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2013); Cosmetology Con-
tinuing Education, TEX. DEP'T LICENSING & REc., http://www.license.state.tx.us/
cosmet/cosmetce.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
142 See discussion supra Part I.C.
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that typically fly for hire and on demand; and (3) large commer-
cial operations-larger aircraft with scheduled .commercial
flights for major airlines."' While licensees for the third cate-
gory are strictly required to be airline transport certification
holders, the first and second categories of operations can have
many types of pilot licensees. 4
Recently, the DOT issued a report regarding the FAA's over-
sight of on-demand aircraft operations. 45 The on-demand air-
craft category makes up a part of the overall general aviation
group and has experienced the increase in accidents common
to this type of aviation. 6 On-demand aircraft conduct on-de-
mand passenger or cargo operations and can range in size from
a single-pilot, small, two-seat aircraft to a larger plane with ten or
more seats.14 1 On-demand aircraft operations include airplanes
flying unscheduled passenger service, medical transport, rescue,
commercial sightseeing, and smaller cargo transport.14 8 While
private aviation has the least restrictive regulations and receives
the least FAA oversight in general, on-demand aviation is the
second-least regulated operation category and does not receive
nearly the level of oversight the FAA provides for large sched-
uled commercial aircraft.14 9
The DOT found many significant differences in the FAA's
regulation of on-demand general aviation aircraft versus their
commercial airline counterparts. 5 o For example, on-demand
operators are generally subject to more risk due to the nature of
the work but are subject to fewer FAA regulations.15 ' On-de-
mand operators fly shorter, more frequent flights and therefore
143 FAA, REP. No. AV-2009-066, ON-DEMAND OPERATORS HAVE LESS STRINGENT
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT THAN LARGE COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS 2-3
(July 13, 2009), available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/On-
Demand Final Report.pdf [hereinafter FAA REPORT].
144 Kevin M. Reynolds, Part 91 and 135 Operations: An Important Difference, WHIT-
FIELD & EDDY, PLC, available at http://www.whitfieldlaw.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/Part_91v 1 1 72 18 4 0 4 3 8 4 3 .pdf (demonstrating that a "flight"
is defined by "flight operation," not pilot license type, and that pilot license types
can be used to fly several different types of flight operations).
145 FAA REPORT, supra note 143, at 1.
146 Press Release, NTSB, Annual Aviation Statistics for 2011 Released: No Fatal-
ities on U.S. Airlines or Commuters, General Aviation Accidents Increased (Apr.
27, 2012) (on file with author).
147 See FAA REPORT, supra nOte 143, at 2.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 5-16.
151 Id. at 3.
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are required to perform more takeoffs and landings, which are
historically the most dangerous part of an airplane's flight.'5 2
These takeoffs and landings can also be in more remote loca-
tions than the major airports required by commercial airliners,
and can involve places that are less likely to have helpful air traf-
fic control towers and available emergency equipment.1 5 3 Data
shows that in 2007 and 2008, there were no commercial air car-
rier passenger deaths.154 Contrastingly, over the same time pe-
riod, on-demand accidents resulted in 109 deaths even though
the total number of hours flown by these operators was much
lower. 5 5
In addition, commercial airliners are required to have an
FAA-licensed dispatcher available and checking in throughout
the entire flight, serving as a second set of eyes on weather re-
ports and ensuring that the commercial airliner is flying safely as
planned.'5 6 In contrast, on-demand flights are missing this sec-
ond set of eyes even though the flight plans for these trips might
change at the last minute-depending on emergency or other
needs-and the destination airports might be unfamiliar to the
on-demand operator. 5 1
After analyzing the data above, the DOT found that the FAA's
regulation of general aviation operators, unlike that of commer-
cial aviation operators, is not risk-based.' 5 8 On-demand opera-
tors have higher risks than many commercial pilots; however,
the regulations overseeing these operators are much less sub-
stantive. The FAA needs to reanalyze its method of regulating
general aviation and change it to reflect the ways in which com-
mercial aviation is managed. The decrease in the commercial
aviation accident rate shows that the safety regulations and man-
agement techniques implemented are working. These same
ideas should be used to revamp regulations for all general avia-
tion aircraft as a risk-dependent management system, versus
strictly a basic inspection-type system.




156 Id. at 7.
157 See id.
188 See id. at 14-15.
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B. INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE REGULATIONS
Aircraft must be manufactured to meet rigid FAA design crite-
ria and performance specifications. Each year, all aircraft are re-
quired to have an extensive inspection conducted by an FAA-
certified inspector to ensure continued compliance with FAA
regulations and standards.1 5' Aircraft for hire have an extra re-
quirement: an inspection must be done every 100 flight hours,
which could be as often as once a month.' The goal of these
inspections is to spot damage, corrosion, or other possible issues
long before the result is aircraft failure."'1
There are definite differences between maintenance and in-
spection requirements for private aircraft versus airline or com-
mercial operators.6 2 When a new aircraft is being designed,
groups are formed to study those planes and "determine the fre-
quency and scope of aircraft inspections to be performed."' 3
These "maintenance steering groups" (MSGs) and "industry
steering committees" (ISCs) combine the regulation knowledge
of an aviation authority, the engineering and construction
knowledge of the plane manufacturer, and the expertise of
other selected industry participants with knowledge of how the
airline industry generally works.' 4 These groups provide infor-
mation to another group, the maintenance review board
(MRB), which makes final recommendations to the manufac-
turer on how the aircraft should be maintained. 6 ' The mainte-
nance planning recommendations are then given to the
customer by the manufacturer.16 6 Small, private aircraft owners
use this information to correctly maintain and inspect the air-
plane to make sure it continues to meet the safety standards it
was originally designed for.' 6 7 However, for scheduled commer-
cial airlines, there is another step in the process.'
For commercial airliners, the recommendations given by the
MRB are taken and incorporated into a set of FAA requirements
159 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.15(c), 91.409 (2012).
16o Id. § 91.409(b).
161 See Required Aircraft Inspections, AVIATION SAFETY BuREAu, http://www.avia
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known as the Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program
(CAMP). "' CAMP involves both routine and detailed inspec-
tions.17 0 In turn, the detailed inspections can involve differing
levels of detail depending on the flight hours and time
elapsed.17 1 For example, the "A check" (the least detailed in-
spection) is performed approximately every 500 flight hours and
usually requires an overnight process to complete. 7 2 The "B
check" (the next level of detail inspection) involves a slightly
more detailed inspection process but does not include "detailed
disassembly or removal of components." 7 The "C check" is per-
formed every twelve to eighteen months and puts the aircraft
out of service for three to five days for extensive retooling and
testing.17 ' The most comprehensive inspection is the "D check,"
which occurs every four to five years.17 5 During the D check, the
entire airplane is more or less taken apart for inspection and
overhaul."1 7 "[E]very fastener, nut, wire, hinge, and component"
is inspected, repaired, and, if needed, replaced.' 7 7 This intense
inspection looks for evidence of corrosion, structural deforma-
tion, cracking, deterioration, stress, and all other issues that can
arise during the normal use of an airplane.77 A large commer-
cial airliner goes through all of these checks as they become
due,'7 1 in addition to the routine required base inspections
needed for all types of aircraft. For an example of the difference
between commercial and private plane inspections, one on-de-
mand operator in the DOT study above was subject to FAA in-
spection eight times in 2008.8o In contrast, a commercial airline
operator overseen by the same FAA oversight office received 199





173 Jack Hessburg, What's This "A" Check, "C" Check Stuffl, AviATIONPROS.COM
(Apr. 2000), http://www.aviationpros.com/article/10388655/whats-this-a-check-
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174 Id.; Required Aircraft Inspections, supra note 161.
175 Required Aircraft Inspections, supra note 161.
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180 See FAA REPORT, supra note 143, at 3.
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In addition, special aging aircraft inspections are needed for
certain aircraft.' 2 The Aging Airplane Safety Rule requires that
all commercial planes and some multi-engine general aviation
aircraft undergo specific inspections for aging after their four-
teenth year in service.' 8 "[H]igh aircraft time, severe operation,
inactivity, outside storage, modifications, or poor maintenance"
are all issues that can be found in aging aircraft, and the aging
aircraft inspections focus on issues outside of the normal re-
quired inspections for general aviation aircraft.18 4 These aging
inspections focus on specific maintenance requirements that are
highly sensitive to age and failure over time.1 5 The aging in-
spections also include a records review of the aircraft, which
highlights any time of inactivity or missed maintenance inspec-
tions over an extended period that might lead to additional
problems not noticed by the basic annual inspection.' The Ag-
ing Airplane Safety Rule prohibits pilots from operating an ag-
ing plane under FAR Parts 121, 129, or 135 until the airplane
has undergone the aging review process.'
Small planes are typically not inspected beyond the basic an-
nual review required by 14 C.F.R. § 43.15 and the additional
100-flight-hour inspection required for single-engine airplanes
operated for hire.'" However, the general aviation accident rate
is far worse than the rate for scheduled commercial aircraft.'89 It
cannot be a coincidence that safety is far better when inspec-
tions are more frequent. Additionally, the general aviation fleet
is old.' In 2009, the average age of a single-engine plane used
in the United States was thirty-nine years.' 9' In comparison, the
current average age of a commercial plane is approximately
182 See BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR MAINTAINING AGING GENERAL AVIATION AIR-
PLANES 7 (2003) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES GUIDE]; see also FAA REPORT, Supra
note 143, at 8.
183 FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-84, AGING AIRCRAFT
INSPECTIONS AND RECORDS REVIEWs 2 (2009) [hereinafter ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-
84].
184 BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 182, at 7; see also 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.15(a),
91.409 (2012).
185 BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 182, at 7-8, 13-22.
186 Id. at 3-6.
187 ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-84, supra note 183, at 3.
188 BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 182, at 2.
189 See generally Review of Accident Data, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., http://www
.ntsb.gov/data/aviation_stats.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
190 BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 182, at 1.
191 Kevin Thomas, A Glance at the 2009 General Aviation Statistical Databook and
Industry Outlook, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/arti-
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eleven years.' 2 However, the commercial aircraft are the ones
subject to the extensive aging inspection requirements, not the
general aviation fleet.19 3
The age of the commercial fleet might be a direct reflection
of the fact that as an aircraft ages, it becomes a safety risk; the
increased number of aging inspections are identifying aging is-
sues and allowing carriers to remove these planes from their
fleets before accidents occur. The age of the commercial fleet
could also be much younger due to the additional inspections,
time, money, and maintenance required by an aging plane ver-
sus a newer one. Either way, the aging inspections are working
correctly in identifying issues requiring the repair or disabling
of aircraft before they become a safety risk.
Many older aircraft that have been correctly maintained and
inspected are "still capable of safe and useful operation in to-
day's [aviation] environment."1 14 Because many plane technol-
ogy upgrades are affordable, a general aviation pilot is able to
upgrade components without having to purchase a new air-
craft."' With few new, cost-competitive airplane models availa-
ble on the market, thorough inspections and maintenance
could allow existing planes to remain in the sky much longer
than the original expected lifetime."' Better inspections could
lead to lower overall costs for plane owners, as well as result in
an increase in safety.197
As of the year 2000, mechanical and maintenance issues were
the cause of only 16% of general aviation accidents across the
United States.'" So currently, there are far bigger issues to
worry about than correcting a problem that does not seem to be
as significant. However, as time goes on, this percentage will
continue to increase. By 2020, the average age of the general
cle/a-glance-at-the-2009-general-aviation-statistical-databook-and-industry-
outlook.
192 See Scott Mayerowitz, Age of Commercial Planes Suddenly Matters, SFGATE (Apr.
9, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Age-of-commercial-
planes-suddenly-matters-2375538.php.
'93 See ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-84, supra note 183, at 3.
194 See BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 182, at 2.
195 Id. at 1.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Darryl Trcka, President, Greater Hous. Assoc. of Flight Instructors, Presen-
tation at the Flight Instructor Recertification Clinic: General Aviation Accident
Analysis (Jan. 2000).
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aviation fleet could approach fifty years.19 9 At some point, the
mechanical and maintenance issues that surround small, aging,
and inadequately inspected aircraft will rise, leading the general
aviation accident rate to increase over time. The expected trend
of aging general aviation aircraft needs to be taken care of im-
mediately-repairing and replacing an aging general aviation
fleet that consists of 90% of the civil aircraft registered in the
United States will take many years.oo
Overall, the annual inspection for general aviation aircraft
needs to be much more in-depth, and the inspection details
need to be included as part of the FARs. The annual inspection
should also include a research history-combining knowledge
of a plane's past usage with inspection-to customize each indi-
vidual inspection toward the particular areas of an aircraft that
might need additional attention. In addition, aging inspections
should be mandated across the board for all aircraft, as this is an
issue no matter what type of plane is used. While this might re-
sult in additional costs for general aviation pilots, over time the
costs will be less because the inspections will allow aircraft to
continue to fly well beyond the original intended number of
flight hours. These inspections will not only keep general avia-
tion pilots safer in the sky, but will also help renew the current
fleet by forcing owners with planes that should no longer be
flying to replace them with newer, safer technology. If these sug-
gestions are implemented, the general aviation fleet will be able
to change over time and will not require a large overhaul when
all of the current planes reach their expiration date ten or
twenty years from now.
C. DIFFERENCES IN TECHNOLOGY
The technology possessed by scheduled commercial airlines
can be much more advanced than the technology in general avi-
ation aircraft. While this discrepancy is logical considering com-
mercial airlines are much more advanced, fly for longer
distances, and carry more people than general aviation aircraft,
199 BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 182, at 1.
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the safety technology in general aviation aircraft is lagging be-
hind even that of the automobile industry. 201
For example, the U.S. National Highway Safety Bureau first
required automobile manufacturers to install shoulder belts for
front seats in 1968.202 However, the FAA has required shoulder
belts on all seats for newly manufactured airplanes since only
1986.203 In addition, the FAA still does not require older planes
to be retrofitted with shoulder belts.2 0 This is a problem consid-
ering the average age of a general aviation plane is forty years
old.20 5 While small planes can be retrofitted with shoulder belts
for a cost of around $150 to $300 per seat, the NTSB still esti-
mates that up to 26% of all small planes still do not have shoul-
der belts.206 A study released by the NTSB in 2011 determined
that serious injuries or fatalities are 50% more likely to occur
when the plane occupants are wearing only a lap belt but not a
shoulder harness.0 7 In 2011, the NTSB finally recommended
that the FAA require older aircraft to be retrofitted with shoul-
der harnesses. 20 s The NTSB found that the shoulder seat belt
was the "cheapest and simplest" way of decreasing the fatality
rate in crashes.209 Of course, the automobile industry has known
this since the mid-1900s. 21 0
While air bags have been required in cars for over a decade,
there is still no air bag requirement for general aviation air-
craft.' Currently, only 7,000 out of the 224,000 general avia-
tion aircraft are equipped with air bags. 1 This is less than 5% of
201 See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, Study Recommends Installing Air Bags on Private Planes,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
4458204576074270205924638.html.
202 Getting America to Buckle Up, TRAFFIC SAFETY CTR. (Dec. 2002), http://safe
trec.berkeley.edu/newsletter/DecO2/Seatbelts.html.
203 NTSB Calls for Lap/Shoulder Belts on Small Planes, Cin. BREAKING Bus. (Jan.
11, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://archive.chicagobreakingbusiness.com/2011/01/ntsb-
calls-for-lapshoulder-belts-on-small-planes.html.
204 Id.
205 See Thomas, supra note 191.
200 NTSB Calls for Lap/Shoulder Belts on Small Planes, supra note 203.
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all registered general aviation aircraft!"' However, while recog-
nizing the fact that air bags have been directly attributed to sav-
ing lives in general aviation accidents, the NTSB
recommendations do not call for a federal mandate requiring
air bag installation because out of the 7,000 planes equipped
with air bags, too few of these planes have crashed to make an
overall determination of whether the safety risk has decreased
because of the installation of air bags.214 In summary, since
hardly any general aviation planes have air bags, the NTSB has
few accidents to study where air bags have deployed, so it hesi-
tates to require air bags in general aviation planes. Instead, the
NTSB has only asked manufacturers to install the devices in new
aircraft.2 15
Although lagging behind automobile manufacturers, the
commercial airline industry, which includes aviation regulators,
is aware of the benefits of air bags in public aircraft. 2 1 6 Existing
federal rules require passengers in scheduled commercial air-
craft to be protected from injury sustained by hitting either the
seat in front of them or the inside walls of the aircraft." Be-
cause of this requirement, certain seats in airliners are already
protected by air bags, including seats located near bulkheads
and premium seats that lie down or turn sideways.2 18 Federal
safety regulations mandate extra crash protection for these par-
ticular seats, and air bags are seen as an easy way to offer this
protection. 2 19
Thankfully, more than thirty general aviation manufacturers
have already stepped in where the NTSB and FAA have failed by
offering air bags as either standard or optional equipment.220
Cessna and Cirrus, two of the larger general aviation manufac-
turers, voluntarily began offering air bags as standard features
on all new planes manufactured after 2004.221 In addition, older
213 Pasztor, supra note 201.
214 Heller, supra note 212.
215 Id.
216 See Dave Kolpack, Airbags in Airplanes?'Seat Belt Safety Device Gaining Traction,
NBCNEWS (Sept. 20, 2010, 11:31 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39270568/
ns/travel-news/t/airbags-airplanes-seat-belt-safety-device-gaining-traction/.
217 See id.
218 See Pasztor, supra note 201.
219 See Kolpack, supra note 216.
220 See iNTSB Calls for Lap/Shoulder Belts on Small Planes, supra note 203.
221 See id.
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planes can be retrofitted with air bags for around $1,000 per air
bag.222
A consequence of the differing technology between commer-
cial and general aviation planes-as well as the differences
within a general aviation fleet composed of planes that range in
age from brand new to over fifty years old-is that planes can be
very different depending on which one a pilot is currently flying.
Aviation technology has changed quite a bit over time, and
many older pilots might not be equipped to handle some of the
newer instrumentation in modern aircraft. Similarly, younger pi-
lots might have trouble flying older aircraft that lack the mod-
ern technologies they usually rely upon when flying.
Pilots of scheduled commercial aircraft typically have exten-
sive flight experience in many types of aircraft of various com-
plexities.2 In addition, these pilots have specialized training to
"operate whatever specific airplane model the individual was
hired to fly."224 In contrast, many general aviation pilots fly
solely for personal reasons and thus no training or instruction is
required for a specific plane model before they can be pilot-in-
command of a solo flight.2 2" The only instructions for operation,
maintenance, and inspection are recommendations from the
manufacturer of the small aircraft they are piloting.226 However,
manufacturers have no liability in this area because they typi-
cally have no duty to adequately train or specifically warn pilots
that purchase or use their aircraft.2 7 While manufacturers have
a duty to provide "legally adequate" instructions, that is the ex-
tent of their duty.228 To be legally adequate, the instructions
must (1) "attract the attention of those that the product could
harm; (2) explain the mechanism and mode of injury; and (3)
provide instructions on ways to safely use the product to avoid
injury. Unfortunately, many general aviation pilots must
222 See Heller, supra note 212.
223 Becoming a Commercial Airline Pilot, AEROSPACEWEB.ORG, http://www.aero
spaceweb.org/question/careers/q0308.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).
224 Id.
225 See Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011) (noting that while a two-day "transition training" was provided in the
purchase price of the plane in Glorvigen, FAA regulations do not require manu-
facturers to offer any training).
226 See FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., FAA-H-8083-25A, PILOT's HANDBOOK OF
AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE 8-1 (2008).
227 See, e.g., Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 551-52.
228 Id. at 550.
229 Id.
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learn the information on their own; and much of this learning
will take place overhead in the skies as pilots get accustomed to
flying a new aircraft.
It is important for the general aviation industry, including the
FAA, to increase mandates for proven safety equipment in all
general aviation aircraft, old or new. While there is a monetary
cost associated with installing this equipment, the amount is
small compared to other costs related to general aviation
planes,"'o and it will pay off when the fatality rate in general avia-
tion accidents decreases over time. In addition, as these safety
technologies become industry standard, costs will decrease as
more and more manufacturers offer the required equipment.
Considering that earning the right to fly involves one of the
most in-depth training processes in the transportation industry,
the FAA needs to lead the way and apply the same scrutiny to
safety requirements after pilots earn a license.
In addition, as the general aviation fleet ages and new planes
and technologies are introduced, the FAA needs to revamp the
regulations surrounding airplane purchase and transfer. Many
pilots should be required to incorporate new, safer technologies
into aircraft as new regulations come onboard, and adequate
training for these technologies should be required so that a pi-
lot does not have to learn how to use them by actually flying the
plane. Manufacturers should be required to provide, and pilots
should be required to attend, educational training seminars for
pilots purchasing a general aviation aircraft from the company,
and on-demand carriers should not be allowed to let their pilots
fly a plane they have no experience flying until they fly with a co-
pilot who has operated that plane before. Unlike drivers of cars,
pilots do not have a "parking lot" to drive around in to figure
out the new instrumentation locations, warning systems, and up-
dated technologies until they are high in the air. The best
method for a pilot to learn how these technologies function is
with another pilot who is already comfortable operating the air-
plane model; the experienced pilot can focus on safety, and the
newer pilot can focus on learning the format of the new plane.
230 Compare NTSB Calls for Lap/Shoulder Belts on Small Planes, supra note 203
(noting that the cost of a shoulder belt ranges from $150 to $300 per seat), and
Pasztor, supra note 201 (noting that the installation of air bags on the two front
seats of a general aviation aircraft costs approximately $2,000), with GRA, INc.,
EcoNoMic VALUES FOR FAA INVESTMENT AND REGULATORY DECISIONS, A GUIDE 4-
17-4-18 (2007) (describing aircraft operating and fixed costs).
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In 2011, the FAA asked the General Aviation Joint Steering
Committee (Steering Committee) to investigate the increase in
general aviation accidents. 23 ' The Steering Committee found
that the largest category of general aviation accidents encom-
passes those that occur when pilots lose control during flight.23 2
However, this type of accident rarely occurs in commercial flight
because current technology warns pilots when the danger ex-
ists. 233 This technology is standard on all commercial aircraft,
and it warns pilots when wings are in danger of losing lift, which
can lead to a loss of control. 234 The Steering Committee even
recommended that the FAA work with manufacturers of small
planes to make it cheaper to install these types of devices on
general aviation planes. 2 35
While the recommendation has not been acted upon, it is a
perfect solution to a typical problem. Part of the issue with in-
stalling additional technologies on private aircraft is that these
aircraft are often owned by individuals or small companies, not
large commercial airliners. A lack of money can prevent many of
these owners from being able to include these technologies on
planes, whether recommended or not. The FAA needs to step in
and correct this issue. The provision of government funding to
research organizations willing to develop these technologies on
a cheaper scale for general aviation flight would move the indus-
try closer to the technology standards by which the rest of the
transportation industry abides. 6 Just as the government helps
other underfunded industries,3 the FAA should help general
aviation owners by creating competition, establishing grants,
and providing funding to graduate students at universities to in-
centivize the development of new technologies in the general
aviation field. Not only would these monetary motivations make
aviation safer overall, but the results would also save lives.
231 Levin, supra note 4.
232 Id.
233 See id. ("Since the 1990s, commercial-airline crashes due to icing, inadver-
tently hitting the ground, mid-air collisions, wind shear and other causes have
been almost wiped out with improved technology and pilot training . ).
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235 Id.
236 See notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
237 See Matt Petryni, Federal Grants for Wind Turbine Tech Training, SMALL Bus.
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ing-14284.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since 2000, the crash rate for commercial jetliners has
dropped by 85%; in contrast, according to the NTSB, the crash
rate for private flights has increased by 20% over the same time
period." In addition, the rate of deadly wrecks in private flights
has increased by 25% since 2000.219 The general aviation fleet
makes up 90% of registered, active aircraft and includes the vast
majority of pilots in the skies. 24 0 These divergent safety numbers
are correctable, and implementing the recommendations given
in this comment will help decrease the accident rate and make
general aviation safer for those in the sky as well as those on the
ground.
First, private pilots are less prepared than their higher-li-
censed counterparts. Initial training and education are ex-
tremely important in ensuring that the safety risk for general
aviation pilots remains low over time. Years of flight experience
do not typically decrease the risk for pilots, which makes the
initial training even more important. Classroom hours and
knowledge exams should be emphasized and ramped up to be
more robust, even for basic private pilot certification. Training
pays off when it comes to safety, and increasing the training re-
quirement is the initial step to correcting the overall accident
rate.
Second, scores on both pilot knowledge and practical exams
are a direct reflection of the safety risks a pilot will take in the
future. When pilots fail an examination required for licensure,
additional classroom study, along with additional examination
time, should be mandatory. The safety risk is higher for these
individuals, and adding these requirements will help keep them
safer once the initial license is earned.
Third, an instrument rating certificate should be necessary to
receive a private pilot's license. While many pilots will never
have a need for the additional certificate because they only fly in
good weather conditions and during the day, the certificate will
be an added protection if the weather suddenly changes or a
last-minute change in flight plan causes the pilot to run into
unexpected weather conditions. Weather-related accidents ac-
count for many of the general aviation incidents because a gen-
eral aviation pilot is five times more likely to be in an accident if
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS Ass'N FoUND., supra note 200, at 1.
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he or she does not obtain an instrument rating.24' These crashes
are easily prevented with the additional meteorology and instru-
ment training required to achieve this certification.
Fourth, the age of sixty-five should be a mandatory retirement
age for all pilots, not just pilots of scheduled commercial airlin-
ers. In many ways, general aviation pilots are more at risk than
pilots of scheduled commercial flights because many general
aviation pilots fly solo and are not in continuous contact with
FAA dispatchers. While general aviation planes generally do not
carry the number of passengers that larger planes carry, the pi-
lot, his or her passengers, and innocent bystanders on the
ground can still be harmed if a general aviation plane goes
down because of pilot incapacitation. If the FAA is unwilling to
expand the mandatory retirement age, then the FAA should add
restrictions based on the areas older pilots fly over or add a re-
quirement that older pilots fly with another trained pilot when
they fly longer distances.
Fifth, the continuing education for current pilots needs to be
revamped and improved. Expecting current pilots to read NTSB
notices or look at statistical safety studies is not realistic. The
continuing education should include free, interactive classroom
training and local seminars to give pilots a user-friendly method
of receiving up-to-date aviation safety information. The FAAS-
Team proficiency program is an optional continuing education
program that the FAA already has in place that meets the above
requirements. 24 2 This program should become mandatory for
all pilots, no matter what license, to keep them informed about
other pilots' mistakes in order to prevent the same mistakes
from happening again. Especially because pilot licenses do not
expire, continuing education should be a regular, expected part
of being a pilot and possessing the privilege to fly.
Sixth, the FAA needs to ensure that the regulations it enacts
are risk-based depending on the type of flying involved. Longer
flights should have more stringent operator requirements than
shorter ones, and pilots who regularly take off and land in new
environments should be trained to meet this particular risk.
Regulations should be individualized by flight risks, license sta-
tus, and type of plane to improve safety across the board.
Seventh, aircraft inspections for general aviation aircraft need
to be more in-depth and should include a research history re-
241 See NTSB SAFETY STUDY, supra note 55, at 34.
242 See FAA Safety Team, supra note 131.
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port with each annual inspection performed. In addition, with
general aviation airplanes getting older, aging inspections
should be mandated for all aircraft to identify and fix problems
before they occur and encourage the slow renewal of an aging
general aviation fleet.
Eighth, mandates for proven safety equipment, including
shoulder seat belts and air bags, should be incorporated in all
aircraft, both old and new. Manufacturers should be required to
provide short, educational teaching seminars on flying particu-
lar plane models as a requirement for pilots before they
purchase a new aircraft. Pilots should not be able to fly new air-
plane models until they have flown in that airplane, not as the
primary pilot, but as a co-pilot.
Lastly, government funding and FAA-sponsored university
projects would go far in helping increase the safety technologies
in general aviation aircraft. Many of the technologies in sched-
uled commercial aircraft would be extremely helpful to general
aviation pilots if they were installed in private planes. University
research and grant programs can help bridge the gap and find
ways to take the same technologies and make them cheaper,
lighter, and standard installations on all private aircraft. General
aviation does not have the large industry-based research funding
enjoyed by the scheduled commercial airline industry, and it is
up to the FAA to help general aviation meet the safety standards
set by the commercial airline industry.
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